Please disregard any stray or handwritten markings on these copies. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 510-521 (1971) (WHITE, J., with BURGER, C.J., concurring and dissenting). v. Novotny. 77-5781. See United States v. Lisk, 522 F.2d 228 (CA7 1975), cert. On appeal after petitioners' conviction, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third Judicial District, affirmed the trial court's denial of petitioners' motion to suppress because it held that "without a proprietary or other similar interest in an automobile, a mere passenger therein lacks standing to challenge the legality of the search of the vehicle." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) Rakas v. Illinois. Indeed, the decision today is contrary to Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277, U.S. 438, 277 U. S. 478 (1928), expressing a view of the Fourth Amendment thought to have been vindicated by Katz. See, Here petitioners, who were passengers occupying a car which they neither owned nor leased, seek to analogize their position to that of the defendant in, In support of their target theory, petitioners rely on the following quotation from, Petitioners claim that they were never asked whether they owned the rifle or shells seized during the search and, citing, Each time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights. . that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself . Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, in which the Court held that the "legitimately on the property" requirement of Jones v. United States , for challenging the legality of a police search, was too broad. The petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights were not abridged here, because none of the factors relied upon by this Court on prior occasions supports petitioners' claim that their alleged expectation of privacy from government intrusion was reasonable. The dissenting opinion suggests that the petitioners here took the same actions to preserve their privacy as did the defendant in Katz: Just as Katz closed the door to the telephone booth after him, petitioners closed the doors to their automobile. . If it is, "tautological to fall back on the notion that those expectations of privacy which are legitimate depend primarily on cases deciding exclusionary rule issues in criminal cases,". asserted." [Footnote 5] Nor does United States v. Jeffers, supra, or. We recognized there that Jones had held that one of those protected interests is created by legitimate presence on the searched premises, even absent any possessory interest. 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 261 (emphasis added). My point in this portion of the opinion is that the Court's lack of faithfulness to the purposes of the Fourth Amendment does not have even the saving grace of providing an easily applied rule. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that prison inmates have no privacy rights in their cells protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, having rejected petitioners' target theory and reaffirmed the principle that the, "rights assured by the Fourth Amendment are personal rights, [which] . Alternatively, petitioners argue that they have standing to object to the search under Jones because they were "legitimately on [the] premises" at the time of the search. As the discussion. But here petitioners' claim is one which would fail even in an analogous situation in a dwelling place, since they made no showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in which they were merely passengers. The judgement and opinion of the Court in Rakas against Illinois will be announced by Mr. Justice Rehnquist. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Chi. See, e.g., Garza-Fuentes v. United States, 400 F.2d 219 (CA5 1968); State v. Bresolin, 13 Wash. App. 312, 449 F.2d 974 (1971) (defendant lawfully present in third person's office has standing to object to police entry into office, since lawfully present, but lacks standing to object to search of drawer of third person's desk, since no showing that he had permission to open or use drawer). Pp. 40-41. For example, an overnight guest in a friend's apartment has such "standing". The minimal privacy that existed simply is not comparable to that, for example, of an individual in his place of abode, see Jones v. United States, supra; of one who secludes himself in a telephone booth, Katz v. United States, supra; or of the traveler who secures his belongings in a locked suitcase or footlocker. Reacting to the precedent established by the recent Supreme Court case United States v. Jones in conjunction with the application of the third party doctrine, Judge Richard D. Bennett, found that "information voluntarily disclosed to a third party ceases to enjoy Fourth Amendment protection" because that information no longer belongs to the consumer, but rather to the telecommunications company that handles the transmissions records. E.g., United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883 (CA5 1978) (en banc); Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699 (CA9 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 412 U. S. 412 U.S. 218 (1973); United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94 (CA4 1962).