Department of Homeland Security U.S. Customs and Border Protection . During 2019, there was a surge in Southwest Border crossings between ports of entry, resulting in 851,508 Border Patrol apprehensions and contributing to what senior U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials described as an “unprecedented border security and humanitarian crisis.” Our unannounced inspections revealed that, under these challenging circumstances, CBP struggled to meet detention standards. CBP concurred with our recommendation.U.S. Finally, in some locations, Border Patrol did not meet certain standards for detainee care, such as offering children access to telephone calls and safeguarding detainee property. CBP’s two covert testing groups do not use risk assessments or intelligence to plan and conduct covert tests at ports of entry and U.S. Border Patrol checkpoints, do not plan coordinated tests, and do not design system-wide tests. Specifically, CBP did not conduct an Analysis of Alternatives to assess and select the most effective, appropriate, and affordable solutions to obtain operational control of the southern border as directed, but instead relied on prior, outdated border solutions to identify materiel alternatives for meeting its mission requirement. Customs and Border Protection has not demonstrated the acquisition capabilities needed to effectively execute the Analyze/Select Phase of the Wall Acquisition Program. Office of Field Operations U.S. Customs and Border Protection John P. Wagner became Deputy Executive Assistan t Commissioner, Office of Field Operations (OFO), on April 6, 2014. This occurred because CBP has not provided adequate guidance on risk- and intelligence-based test planning, directed the groups to coordinate, given them the required authority, or established performance goals and measures for covert testing. DHS concurred with recommendation 1 but did not concur with recommendation 2.Would you like to take a brief survey regarding our site? CBP did not use a sound, well-documented methodology to identify and prioritize investments in areas along the border that would best benefit from physical barriers. This measure is tracked by CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO). CBP and TSA concurred with all four recommendations. Operations, and Office of Field Operations within CBP). OIT has two additional support offices. CBP concurred with all seven recommendations.U.S. Finally, CBP does not effectively manage covert testing groups to ensure data reliability, completeness, and compliance with security requirements due to leadership changes and limited staff. The Office of Field Operations is responsible for the direct execution of the Agency's products and services for America's small businesses. We are determined to keep interruptions to our operations to a minimum, and we appreciate your patience during this time. Covert testing groups do not make recommendations or ensure corrective actions are implemented due to insufficient authority and policies directing these actions. Results are not widely shared because CBP has not defined roles and responsibilities for such sharing. In general, ports of entry are facilities that provide for the controlled entry into or departure from the United States. Despite the new guidance, we continue to have concerns about DHS’ ability to accurately identify and address all family separations due to data reliability issues. Component Overview The strategic context presents the performance budget by tying together strategy, budget resource requests, programs, or PPAs, and performance Following testing, CBP does not widely share covert test results, consistently make recommendations, or ensure corrective actions are taken.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Field operations (OFO) personnel at ports of entry had separated 60 asylum-seeking families between May 6 and July 9, 2018, despite CBP’s claim that it had separated only 7 such families. CBP concurred with the recommendations.U.S. We recommended DHS establish a process to coordinate joint needs across components and maximize savings from strategic sourcing opportunities. We made one recommendation that will help CBP’s data collection. Supplementing a May 2019 Management Alert recommendation, we made two additional recommendations regarding access of unaccompanied alien children to telephones and proper handling of detainee property. DHS concurred with recommendation 2 but did not concur with recommendations 1 and 3. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) identified and targeted high-risk cargo shipments, CBP did not always prevent air carriers from transporting high-risk air cargo from foreign airports into the United States. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) does not comprehensively plan and conduct its covert testing, use test results to address vulnerability, or widely share lessons learned. Consistent with CDC guidance, most Office of Inspector General employees are currently serving the American people remotely. DIRECTOR _____ DEPUTY DIRECTOR PRINCIPAL LEGAL ADVISOR STATE & LOCAL COORDINATION Assistant Director DETENTION POLICY & PLANNING Assistant Director In late June 2018, CBP modified its system for tracking aliens at the ports of entry to capture family separation data consistently, but it could not provide a reliable number of families separated before June 2018. For the purposes of this report we use the term “law enforcement officer” in reference to OFO’s CBP officers, Border Patrol agents, and AMO agents. Office of Trade and Office of Field Operations 66 Appendix IV Status of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Seven Priority Trade Issue Plans 68 Appendix V Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 69 Appendix VI GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 71: Contents : Page ii GAO-17-618 CBP Trade Enforcement : Tables Table 1: CBP’s Priority Trade Issues as of February 2017, …